@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ This lecture describes a linear-quadratic version of a model that Guillermo Calv
4242used to illustrate the ** time inconsistency** of optimal government
4343plans.
4444
45- Like Chang {cite}` chang1998credible ` , we use the model as a laboratory in which to explore the consequences of
45+ Like Chang {cite}` chang1998credible ` , we use the model as a laboratory in which to explore consequences of
4646different timing protocols for government decision making.
4747
4848The model focuses attention on intertemporal tradeoffs between
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ The model focuses attention on intertemporal tradeoffs between
5353The model features
5454
5555- rational expectations
56- - costly government actions at all dates $t \geq 1$ that increase household
57- utilities at dates before $t$
58- - two Bellman equations, one that expresses the private sector's expectation of future inflation
56+ - costly government actions at dates $t \geq 1$ that increase household
57+ utilities at all dates before $t$
58+ - two Bellman equations, one that expresses the private sector's forecast of future inflation
5959 as a function of current and future government actions, another that
6060 describes the value function of a Ramsey planner
6161
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ the actual rate of inflation.
112112
113113(When there is no uncertainty, an assumption of ** rational expectations** simplifies to ** perfect foresight** ).
114114
115- (See {cite}` Sargent77hyper ` for a rational expectations version of the model when there is uncertainty)
115+ (See {cite}` Sargent77hyper ` for a rational expectations version of the model in which there is uncertainty)
116116
117117Subtracting the demand function at time $t$ from the demand
118118function at $t+1$ gives:
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