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Merge pull request #5841 from erik-krogh/libCode
Approved by esbena, ethanpalm
2 parents d05dbb2 + 2f7f9d9 commit 1a91a79

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‎javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/PackageExports.qll‎

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@@ -216,6 +216,10 @@ private DataFlow::Node getAnExportFromModule(Module mod) {
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or
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result = mod.getABulkExportedNode()
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or
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// exports saved to the global object
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result = DataFlow::globalObjectRef().getAPropertyWrite().getRhs() and
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result.getTopLevel() = mod
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or
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result.analyze().getAValue() = TAbstractModuleObject(mod)
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}
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‎javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CodeInjectionCustomizations.qll‎

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@@ -252,6 +252,25 @@ module CodeInjection {
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}
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}
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/**
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* A system command execution of "node", where the executed code is seen as a code injection sink.
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*/
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class NodeCallSink extends Sink {
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NodeCallSink() {
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exists(SystemCommandExecution s |
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s.getACommandArgument().mayHaveStringValue("node")
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or
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s.getACommandArgument() =
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DataFlow::globalVarRef("process").getAPropertyRead("argv").getAPropertyRead("0")
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|
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exists(DataFlow::SourceNode arr | arr = s.getArgumentList().getALocalSource() |
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arr.getAPropertyWrite().getRhs().mayHaveStringValue("-e") and
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this = arr.getAPropertyWrite().getRhs()
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)
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)
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}
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}
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/** A sink for code injection via template injection. */
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abstract private class TemplateSink extends Sink {
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override string getMessageSuffix() {
@@ -356,4 +375,9 @@ module CodeInjection {
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this = LodashUnderscore::member("template").getACall().getArgument(0)
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}
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}
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/**
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* A call to JSON.stringify() seen as a sanitizer.
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*/
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class JSONStringifySanitizer extends Sanitizer, JsonStringifyCall { }
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}

‎javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnsafeCodeConstruction.qll‎

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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
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/**
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* Provides a taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about code
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* constructed from libary input vulnerabilities.
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*
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* Note, for performance reasons: only import this file if
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* `UnsafeCodeConstruction::Configuration` is needed, otherwise
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* `UnsafeCodeConstructionCustomizations` should be imported instead.
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*/
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import javascript
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/**
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* Classes and predicates for the code constructed from library input query.
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*/
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module UnsafeCodeConstruction {
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private import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.CodeInjectionCustomizations::CodeInjection as CodeInjection
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import UnsafeCodeConstructionCustomizations::UnsafeCodeConstruction
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/**
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* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about unsafe code constructed from library input.
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*/
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class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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Configuration() { this = "UnsafeCodeConstruction" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof Sink }
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
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super.isSanitizer(node) or
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node instanceof CodeInjection::Sanitizer
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}
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override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node trg) {
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// HTML sanitizers are insufficient protection against code injection
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src = trg.(HtmlSanitizerCall).getInput()
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or
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DataFlow::localFieldStep(src, trg)
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}
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// override to require that there is a path without unmatched return steps
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override predicate hasFlowPath(DataFlow::SourcePathNode source, DataFlow::SinkPathNode sink) {
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super.hasFlowPath(source, sink) and
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DataFlow::hasPathWithoutUnmatchedReturn(source, sink)
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}
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}
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}

‎javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnsafeCodeConstructionCustomizations.qll‎

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@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
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/**
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* Provides default sources, sinks and sanitizers for reasoning about code
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* constructed from libary input vulnerabilities, as well as extension points for
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* adding your own.
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*/
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import javascript
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/**
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* Module containing sources, sinks, and sanitizers for code constructed from library input.
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*/
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module UnsafeCodeConstruction {
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private import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.CodeInjectionCustomizations::CodeInjection as CodeInjection
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private import semmle.javascript.PackageExports as Exports
15+
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/**
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* A source for code constructed from library input vulnerabilities.
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*/
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abstract class Source extends DataFlow::Node { }
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/**
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* A parameter of an exported function, seen as a source.
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*/
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class ExternalInputSource extends Source, DataFlow::ParameterNode {
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ExternalInputSource() {
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this = Exports::getALibraryInputParameter() and
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// permit parameters that clearly are intended to contain executable code.
28+
not this.getName() = "code"
29+
}
30+
}
31+
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/**
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* A sink for unsafe code constructed from library input vulnerabilities.
34+
*/
35+
abstract class Sink extends DataFlow::Node {
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/**
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* Gets the node where the unsafe code is executed.
38+
*/
39+
abstract DataFlow::Node getCodeSink();
40+
}
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/**
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* Gets a node that is later executed as code in `codeSink`.
44+
*/
45+
private DataFlow::Node isExecutedAsCode(DataFlow::TypeBackTracker t, CodeInjection::Sink codeSink) {
46+
t.start() and result = codeSink
47+
or
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exists(DataFlow::TypeBackTracker t2 | t2 = t.smallstep(result, isExecutedAsCode(t, codeSink)))
49+
}
50+
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/**
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* A string concatenation leaf that is later executed as code.
53+
*/
54+
class StringConcatExecutedAsCode extends Sink, StringOps::ConcatenationLeaf {
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CodeInjection::Sink codeSink;
56+
57+
StringConcatExecutedAsCode() {
58+
this.getRoot() = isExecutedAsCode(DataFlow::TypeBackTracker::end(), codeSink)
59+
}
60+
61+
override DataFlow::Node getCodeSink() { result = codeSink }
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}
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}

‎javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/UnsafeCodeConstruction.qhelp‎

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<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
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"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
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"qhelp.dtd">
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<qhelp>
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<overview>
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<p>
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When a library function dynamically constructs code in a potentially unsafe way, then
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it's important to document to clients of the library that the function should only be
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used with trusted inputs.
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If the function is not documented as being potentially unsafe, then a client may
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incorrectly use inputs containing unsafe code fragments, and thereby leave the
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client vulnerable to code-injection attacks.
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</p>
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</overview>
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<recommendation>
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<p>
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Properly document library functions that construct code from unsanitized
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inputs, or avoid constructing code in the first place.
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</p>
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</recommendation>
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<example>
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<p>
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The following example shows two methods implemented using `eval`: a simple
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deserialization routine and a getter method.
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If untrusted inputs are used with these methods,
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then an attacker might be able to execute arbitrary code on the system.
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</p>
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<sample src="examples/UnsafeCodeConstruction.js" />
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<p>
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To avoid this problem, either properly document that the function is potentially
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unsafe, or use an alternative solution such as `JSON.parse` or another library, like in the examples below,
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that does not allow arbitrary code to be executed.
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</p>
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<sample src="examples/UnsafeCodeConstructionSafe.js" />
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</example>
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<references>
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<li>
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OWASP:
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<a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Code_Injection">Code Injection</a>.
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</li>
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<li>
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Wikipedia: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_injection">Code Injection</a>.
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</li>
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</references>
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</qhelp>

‎javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/UnsafeCodeConstruction.ql‎

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/**
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* @name Unsafe code constructed from libary input
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* @description Using externally controlled strings to construct code may allow a malicious
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* user to execute arbitrary code.
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* @kind path-problem
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* @problem.severity warning
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* @precision medium
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* @id js/unsafe-code-construction
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-094
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* external/cwe/cwe-079
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* external/cwe/cwe-116
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*/
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import javascript
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import DataFlow::PathGraph
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import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.UnsafeCodeConstruction::UnsafeCodeConstruction
18+
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from Configuration cfg, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
20+
where cfg.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
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select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "$@ flows to here and is later $@.", source.getNode(),
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"Library input", sink.getNode().(Sink).getCodeSink(), "interpreted as code"

‎javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/examples/UnsafeCodeConstruction.js‎

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export function unsafeDeserialize(value) {
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return eval(`(${value})`);
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}
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export function unsafeGetter(obj, path) {
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return eval(`obj.${path}`);
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}

‎javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/examples/UnsafeCodeConstructionSafe.js‎

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export function safeDeserialize(value) {
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return JSON.parse(value);
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}
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const _ = require("lodash");
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export function safeGetter(object, path) {
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return _.get(object, path);
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}

‎javascript/ql/src/change-notes/2022-02-04-unsafe-code-construction.md‎

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---
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category: newQuery
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---
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* A new query, `js/unsafe-code-construction`, has been added to the query suite, highlighting libraries that may leave clients vulnerable to arbitary code execution.
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The query is not run by default.

‎javascript/ql/test/library-tests/frameworks/Templating/CodeInjection.expected‎

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@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ nodes
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| app.js:53:30:53:58 | req.que ... tedCode |
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| app.js:54:33:54:64 | req.que ... CodeRaw |
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| app.js:54:33:54:64 | req.que ... CodeRaw |
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| app.js:55:37:55:72 | req.que ... JsonRaw |
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| app.js:55:37:55:72 | req.que ... JsonRaw |
2018
| app.js:56:25:56:48 | req.que ... shSink1 |
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| app.js:56:25:56:48 | req.que ... shSink1 |
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| app.js:58:35:58:68 | req.que ... rString |
@@ -64,11 +62,6 @@ nodes
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:14:42:14:76 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeRaw \| safe }} |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:14:45:14:66 | dataInG ... CodeRaw |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:14:45:14:73 | dataInG ... \| safe |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:46:15:91 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeJsonRaw \| json \| safe }} |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:46:15:91 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeJsonRaw \| json \| safe }} |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:74 | dataInG ... JsonRaw |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:81 | dataInG ... \| json |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:88 | dataInG ... \| safe |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:17:19:17:38 | {{ backslashSink1 }} |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:17:19:17:38 | {{ backslashSink1 }} |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:17:22:17:35 | backslashSink1 |
@@ -96,8 +89,6 @@ edges
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| app.js:53:30:53:58 | req.que ... tedCode | views/njk_sinks.njk:13:42:13:60 | dataInGeneratedCode |
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| app.js:54:33:54:64 | req.que ... CodeRaw | views/njk_sinks.njk:14:45:14:66 | dataInG ... CodeRaw |
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| app.js:54:33:54:64 | req.que ... CodeRaw | views/njk_sinks.njk:14:45:14:66 | dataInG ... CodeRaw |
99-
| app.js:55:37:55:72 | req.que ... JsonRaw | views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:74 | dataInG ... JsonRaw |
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| app.js:55:37:55:72 | req.que ... JsonRaw | views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:74 | dataInG ... JsonRaw |
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| app.js:56:25:56:48 | req.que ... shSink1 | views/njk_sinks.njk:17:22:17:35 | backslashSink1 |
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| app.js:56:25:56:48 | req.que ... shSink1 | views/njk_sinks.njk:17:22:17:35 | backslashSink1 |
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| app.js:58:35:58:68 | req.que ... rString | views/njk_sinks.njk:22:42:22:65 | dataInE ... rString |
@@ -137,10 +128,6 @@ edges
137128
| views/njk_sinks.njk:14:45:14:66 | dataInG ... CodeRaw | views/njk_sinks.njk:14:45:14:73 | dataInG ... \| safe |
138129
| views/njk_sinks.njk:14:45:14:73 | dataInG ... \| safe | views/njk_sinks.njk:14:42:14:76 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeRaw \| safe }} |
139130
| views/njk_sinks.njk:14:45:14:73 | dataInG ... \| safe | views/njk_sinks.njk:14:42:14:76 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeRaw \| safe }} |
140-
| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:74 | dataInG ... JsonRaw | views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:81 | dataInG ... \| json |
141-
| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:81 | dataInG ... \| json | views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:88 | dataInG ... \| safe |
142-
| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:88 | dataInG ... \| safe | views/njk_sinks.njk:15:46:15:91 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeJsonRaw \| json \| safe }} |
143-
| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:49:15:88 | dataInG ... \| safe | views/njk_sinks.njk:15:46:15:91 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeJsonRaw \| json \| safe }} |
144131
| views/njk_sinks.njk:17:22:17:35 | backslashSink1 | views/njk_sinks.njk:17:19:17:38 | {{ backslashSink1 }} |
145132
| views/njk_sinks.njk:17:22:17:35 | backslashSink1 | views/njk_sinks.njk:17:19:17:38 | {{ backslashSink1 }} |
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| views/njk_sinks.njk:22:42:22:65 | dataInE ... rString | views/njk_sinks.njk:22:39:22:68 | {{ dataInEventHandlerString }} |
@@ -161,7 +148,6 @@ edges
161148
| views/hbs_sinks.hbs:33:39:33:68 | {{ dataInEventHandlerString }} | app.js:38:35:38:68 | req.que ... rString | views/hbs_sinks.hbs:33:39:33:68 | {{ dataInEventHandlerString }} | $@ flows to here and is interpreted as code. | app.js:38:35:38:68 | req.que ... rString | User-provided value |
162149
| views/njk_sinks.njk:13:39:13:63 | {{ dataInGeneratedCode }} | app.js:53:30:53:58 | req.que ... tedCode | views/njk_sinks.njk:13:39:13:63 | {{ dataInGeneratedCode }} | $@ flows to here and is interpreted as code. | app.js:53:30:53:58 | req.que ... tedCode | User-provided value |
163150
| views/njk_sinks.njk:14:42:14:76 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeRaw \| safe }} | app.js:54:33:54:64 | req.que ... CodeRaw | views/njk_sinks.njk:14:42:14:76 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeRaw \| safe }} | $@ flows to here and is interpreted as code. | app.js:54:33:54:64 | req.que ... CodeRaw | User-provided value |
164-
| views/njk_sinks.njk:15:46:15:91 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeJsonRaw \| json \| safe }} | app.js:55:37:55:72 | req.que ... JsonRaw | views/njk_sinks.njk:15:46:15:91 | {{ dataInGeneratedCodeJsonRaw \| json \| safe }} | $@ flows to here and is interpreted as code. | app.js:55:37:55:72 | req.que ... JsonRaw | User-provided value |
165151
| views/njk_sinks.njk:17:19:17:38 | {{ backslashSink1 }} | app.js:56:25:56:48 | req.que ... shSink1 | views/njk_sinks.njk:17:19:17:38 | {{ backslashSink1 }} | $@ flows to here and is interpreted as code. | app.js:56:25:56:48 | req.que ... shSink1 | User-provided value |
166152
| views/njk_sinks.njk:22:39:22:68 | {{ dataInEventHandlerString }} | app.js:58:35:58:68 | req.que ... rString | views/njk_sinks.njk:22:39:22:68 | {{ dataInEventHandlerString }} | $@ flows to here and is interpreted as code. | app.js:58:35:58:68 | req.que ... rString | User-provided value |
167153
| views/njk_sinks.njk:23:39:23:78 | {{ dataInEventHandlerStringRaw \| safe }} | app.js:59:38:59:74 | req.que ... ringRaw | views/njk_sinks.njk:23:39:23:78 | {{ dataInEventHandlerStringRaw \| safe }} | $@ flows to here and is interpreted as code. | app.js:59:38:59:74 | req.que ... ringRaw | User-provided value |

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