diff --git a/rules/defense_evasion_dll_sideloading_via_microsoft_office_dropped_file.yml b/rules/defense_evasion_dll_sideloading_via_microsoft_office_dropped_file.yml
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+name: DLL Side-Loading via Microsoft Office dropped file
+id: d808175d-c4f8-459d-b17f-ca9a88890c04
+version: 1.0.0
+description: |
+  Identifies Microsoft Office process creating a DLL or other variant of an executable object which
+  is later loaded by a trusted binary. Adversaries may exploit this behavior by delivering malicious 
+  modules via Microsoft Office documents.
+labels:
+  tactic.id: TA0005
+  tactic.name: Defense Evasion
+  tactic.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+  technique.id: T1574
+  technique.name: Hijack Execution Flow
+  technique.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+  subtechnique.id: T1574.002
+  subtechnique.name: DLL Side-Loading
+  subtechnique.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
+
+condition: >
+  sequence
+  maxspan 6m
+    |create_file and (file.extension iin ('.dll', '.cpl', '.ocx') or file.is_dll) and ps.name iin msoffice_binaries| by file.path
+    |(load_unsigned_or_untrusted_dll) and pe.is_signed = true and ps.name not iin msoffice_binaries
+      and
+     image.path not imatches '?:\\Windows\\assembly\\NativeImages_*'
+      and
+     ps.exe not imatches
+      (
+        '?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe',
+        '?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe',
+        '?:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe'
+      )
+    | by image.path
+
+output: >
+  Suspicious DLL %1.file.path dropped by Microsoft Office process %1.ps.exe and subsequently loaded by process %2.ps.exe
+severity: high
+
+min-engine-version: 2.4.0