LDAP Channel Binding and LDAP Signing #1828
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Title/Context (TrustedSec, Jan 29, 2026)
The post explains two distinct Active Directory (AD) hardening controls—LDAP Channel Binding and LDAP Signing—and why they matter for stopping real-world person-in-the-middle, relay/forwarding, and replay-style abuse of LDAP authentication flows (i.e., an attacker positioning between an application/system and the Domain Controller (DC) to obtain a “valid authentication ticket”). It emphasizes that many environ...
🔧 Technical Details
LDAP Channel Binding (CBT) anti-relay hardening: When LDAP binds occur over SSL/TLS (LDAPS), bind the authentication to the specific TLS tunnel by requiring Channel Binding Tokens (CBTs). Deploy by setting the DC policy “Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements” to “When Supported” first to generate audit events (e.g., 3039 plus the KB4520412 “what-if” events 3074/3075 on Server 2019/2022 DCs), then switch to “Always” to reject LDAPS binds that omit CBT data or would fail CBT validation, thereby preventing forwarded/relayed authentication across different TLS channels.
LDAP Signing integrity + relay resistance: Require clients to cryptographically sign LDAP requests so DCs reject unsigned authentication requests and detect message tampering. Implement in two places: (1) client-side GPO “Network security: LDAP client signing requirements = Require signing”, and (2) DC-side signing requirements (“Require signing” on older DC policy; on Server 2025 DCs us...
🤖 Agent Actions
Summary:
Testing:
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.