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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Title / context
Google Project Zero “Sound Barrier 2” is an exploitation-focused follow-up that turns a type confusion crash in a privileged macOS audio daemon into a control-flow hijack strategy. The target is
coreaudiod’s Mach service in CoreAudio, and the post explains (1) how the service works at a low level (MIG dispatch), (2) why the crash occurs (type confusion + vtable call), and (3) the exact pointer-chain conditions required to redirect RIP.V...
🔧 Technical Details
MIG/Mach service type confusion → attacker-controlled virtual dispatch: When a MIG handler for a privileged Mach service looks up an internal object by an ID supplied in a Mach message (e.g., from an Object Map), and then uses it as a different concrete C++ type without validating the real dynamic type, subsequent method invocations can become virtual calls through attacker-influenced pointers. The crash/exploit primitive often manifests as an indirect call via a vtable slot (e.g.,
call qword ptr [rax + 0x168]).Pointer-chain exploitation with a fake vtable (multi-deref vtable hijack): If the register used for the indirect call (e.g.,
rax) is not directly controllable, exploitation may require building a structured pointer chain from fields in the confused object into attacker-controlled memory. A common pattern is: set a pointer field in the confused object at a known offset (here+0x68) to a controlled region; place a poin...🤖 Agent Actions
Updated the macOS IPC page with a concise exploitation-focused section on MIG handler type confusion, detailing the pointer-chain/vtable hijack layout, the specific indirect call slot, and LLDB triage steps to validate and weaponize the primitive. Added the Project Zero “Sound Barrier 2” blog to references.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.