fix(auth): validate origin of oauth callback to prevent login csrf #1093
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This pull request fixes a critical security vulnerability in the OAuth login flow where the application accepted OAuth callback messages from any origin.
Previously, the
postMessageevent listener inloginWithRocketChatOAuthdid not validate the origin of incoming messages. This allowed malicious websites to forge OAuth callbacks and potentially force users to log in with attacker-controlled accounts.Closes #1071
Fix
event.originmatches the trusted Rocket.Chat server originconfig.api.baseUrlOnly messages from the configured Rocket.Chat server are now accepted.