Add demo files with intentional security vulnerabilities for GitHub A…

[CalinL]

…dvanced Security training

• Created Terraform configuration for Azure resources including a VM, network security group, and public IP.
• Added insecure JavaScript and Python scripts demonstrating vulnerabilities such as eval injection and exception handling issues.
• Introduced an ARM template with insecure configurations, including hardcoded credentials and CORS misconfigurations.
• Developed a Flask application with SQL injection risks and insecure regex patterns.
• Implemented a Razor page with hardcoded API keys, log forging vulnerabilities, and insecure database connections.

[github-actions]

Dependency Review

The following issues were found:

• ❌ 3 vulnerable package(s)
• ❌ 7 package(s) with incompatible licenses
• ✅ 0 package(s) with invalid SPDX license definitions
• ✅ 0 package(s) with unknown licenses.

See the Details below.

Snapshot Warnings

⚠️: No snapshots were found for the head SHA 81c56ca.

Ensure that dependencies are being submitted on PR branches and consider enabling retry-on-snapshot-warnings. See the documentation for more information and troubleshooting advice.

Vulnerabilities

devsecops-demo/Pipfile.lock

Name	Version	Vulnerability	Severity
flask	2.0.2	Flask vulnerable to possible disclosure of permanent session cookie due to missing Vary: Cookie header	high
werkzeug	2.0.2	High resource usage when parsing multipart form data with many fields	high
		Werkzeug debugger vulnerable to remote execution when interacting with attacker controlled domain	high
		Werkzeug DoS: High resource usage when parsing multipart/form-data containing a large part with CR/LF character at the beginning	moderate
		Werkzeug safe_join not safe on Windows	moderate
		Werkzeug possible resource exhaustion when parsing file data in forms	moderate
		Werkzeug safe_join() allows Windows special device names	moderate
		Werkzeug safe_join() allows Windows special device names with compound extensions	moderate
jinja2	3.0.2	Jinja vulnerable to HTML attribute injection when passing user input as keys to xmlattr filter	moderate
		Jinja vulnerable to HTML attribute injection when passing user input as keys to xmlattr filter	moderate
		Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method	moderate
		Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames	moderate
		Jinja2 vulnerable to sandbox breakout through attr filter selecting format method	moderate

Only included vulnerabilities with severity moderate or higher.

License Issues

devsecops-demo/Pipfile.lock

Package	Version	License	Issue Type
flask	2.0.2	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
werkzeug	2.0.2	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
jinja2	3.0.2	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
click	8.0.1	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
itsdangerous	2.0.1	BSD-2-Clause	Incompatible License
markupsafe	2.0.1	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License
python-dotenv	0.19.0	BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause	Incompatible License

Allowed Licenses:

MIT, Apache-2.0, GPL-3.0

OpenSSF Scorecard

Package	Version	Score	Details
pip/flask	2.0.2	🟢 5.9	Details Check Score Reason Code-Review ⚠️ 1 Found 4/24 approved changesets -- score normalized to 1 Maintained 🟢 10 30 commit(s) and 11 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Signed-Releases 🟢 8 4 out of the last 5 releases have a total of 4 signed artifacts. Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Vulnerabilities ⚠️ 0 11 existing vulnerabilities detected SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/werkzeug	2.0.2	🟢 6	Details Check Score Reason Code-Review ⚠️ 0 Found 1/11 approved changesets -- score normalized to 0 Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo Maintained 🟢 10 30 commit(s) and 15 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Fuzzing ⚠️ 0 project is not fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Vulnerabilities 🟢 10 0 existing vulnerabilities detected Signed-Releases 🟢 6 3 out of the last 5 releases have a total of 3 signed artifacts. Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/jinja2	3.0.2	🟢 5.3	Details Check Score Reason Maintained ⚠️ 1 0 commit(s) and 2 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 1 Code-Review ⚠️ 0 Found 1/18 approved changesets -- score normalized to 0 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Signed-Releases 🟢 10 4 out of the last 4 releases have a total of 4 signed artifacts. Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Vulnerabilities ⚠️ 0 14 existing vulnerabilities detected SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/click	8.0.1	🟢 6.3	Details Check Score Reason Maintained 🟢 10 30 commit(s) and 21 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Code-Review 🟢 5 Found 7/13 approved changesets -- score normalized to 5 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Signed-Releases 🟢 4 2 out of the last 5 releases have a total of 2 signed artifacts. Vulnerabilities 🟢 4 6 existing vulnerabilities detected Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/itsdangerous	2.0.1	🟢 4.9	Details Check Score Reason Code-Review ⚠️ 0 Found 1/23 approved changesets -- score normalized to 0 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Maintained ⚠️ 0 0 commit(s) and 0 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 0 Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 8 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 8 Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging ⚠️ -1 packaging workflow not detected Signed-Releases 🟢 10 1 out of the last 1 releases have a total of 1 signed artifacts. Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Vulnerabilities ⚠️ 0 14 existing vulnerabilities detected SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/markupsafe	2.0.1	🟢 5.3	Details Check Score Reason Maintained ⚠️ 0 0 commit(s) and 1 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 0 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo Code-Review ⚠️ 1 Found 3/22 approved changesets -- score normalized to 1 Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 9 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 9 Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Fuzzing 🟢 10 project is fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Packaging 🟢 10 packaging workflow detected Vulnerabilities ⚠️ 1 9 existing vulnerabilities detected Security-Policy 🟢 9 security policy file detected Branch-Protection 🟢 3 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches Signed-Releases 🟢 8 4 out of the last 5 releases have a total of 4 signed artifacts. SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0
pip/python-dotenv	0.19.0	🟢 5.3	Details Check Score Reason Code-Review 🟢 4 Found 12/28 approved changesets -- score normalized to 4 Maintained 🟢 10 13 commit(s) and 1 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo Security-Policy 🟢 10 security policy file detected Token-Permissions ⚠️ 0 detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Pinned-Dependencies ⚠️ 0 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 0 Packaging ⚠️ -1 packaging workflow not detected License 🟢 10 license file detected Fuzzing ⚠️ 0 project is not fuzzed Vulnerabilities 🟢 9 1 existing vulnerabilities detected Signed-Releases ⚠️ -1 no releases found Branch-Protection ⚠️ 0 branch protection not enabled on development/release branches SAST ⚠️ 0 SAST tool is not run on all commits -- score normalized to 0

Scanned Files

• devsecops-demo/Pipfile.lock

In general, to fix this issue you should avoid bare except: clauses and avoid catching BaseException directly. Instead, catch the specific exception types you actually expect, and allow KeyboardInterrupt and SystemExit (and other unexpected critical exceptions) to propagate.

For this specific file, the first try block at lines 7–10 is at risk. Accessing xs[7] and xs[8] can raise IndexError. We can make the handling explicit by replacing except: with except IndexError: so that only index errors are caught and quietly ignored, while KeyboardInterrupt and SystemExit continue to propagate normally. This preserves existing behavior (ignoring index errors) but removes the overly broad exception handling. The second try block on lines 14–16 is not part of the reported finding; it also uses except: but its behavior (continuing on any error while iterating) depends on catching TypeError. Changing that could alter behavior, and CodeQL did not flag that line in the prompt, so we will leave it unchanged.

No new imports or helper methods are required. The only change is narrowing the exception type in the first except clause in devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py.

In general, empty except blocks should be replaced with handlers that (a) catch specific exception types instead of bare except:, and (b) do something meaningful: log the error, clean up resources, re‑raise, or otherwise handle the condition. Swallowing all exceptions with pass hides failures and complicates debugging.

For this snippet, the code inside the first try block is indexing into a fixed list xs. The likely error is IndexError when accessing xs[8]. To fix the issue without changing the observable functionality too much, we can:

• Replace the bare except: with except IndexError as exc:.
• Inside the handler, print an informative message including the exception, instead of silently passing.

This preserves that the program continues after an indexing failure but no longer hides the reason. No new imports are required, and only lines around the except statement in devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py need to be changed.

In general, to fix this issue, replace bare except: (or except BaseException:) with handlers for more specific exception classes, most commonly except Exception: or a narrower subset, and handle SystemExit/KeyboardInterrupt separately if they truly need to be caught. This ensures that program termination and user interrupts are not silently swallowed.

For this file, there are two bare except: blocks:

• Lines 7–10: accesses xs[7] and xs[8], which may raise IndexError.
• Lines 14–16: does str(y+3) where y may be None, which may raise TypeError.

To preserve behaviour (ignore the error and continue) while avoiding catching KeyboardInterrupt/SystemExit, we should:

• Narrow the first handler to except Exception: (or even more specific IndexError:). Since the intent is simply “ignore indexing errors”, Exception is sufficient and safer than a bare except:.
• Narrow the second handler to except Exception: (or more specific TypeError:) so that KeyboardInterrupt and SystemExit are not caught, but type errors still cause the loop to continue as before.

No new imports or helper functions are needed. Only the two except: lines must be changed in devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py.

---

To fix an unused import, you remove the import statement for the module that is not referenced anywhere in the file. This reduces clutter and avoids misleading readers about dependencies.

In this case, within devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py, the line import telnetlib at line 19 is unused. The best fix that does not change existing functionality is simply to delete this line and leave the rest of the file intact. No additional methods, imports, or definitions are required, and no other code needs to be updated because nothing references telnetlib.

Concretely:

• Edit devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py.
• Remove line 19 (import telnetlib), leaving the surrounding code unchanged.
• Keep import ftplib as-is, since that import is not part of this specific report.

To fix an unused import, the general approach is to remove the import statement for any module that is not referenced in the file. This reduces unnecessary dependencies and makes the code clearer.

In this case, the single best fix without changing functionality is to delete the import ftplib line on line 20 in devsecops-demo/insecure-01.py. No other code changes are needed, since nothing in the snippet uses ftplib. The existing hashlib usages and other code remain untouched.

To fix an unused import, remove only the unused name from the import statement while leaving the used ones intact. This preserves all existing behavior while cleaning up the dependency list.

In devsecops-demo/routes-01.py, on line 2, make_response is imported but never used. The best fix is to edit that line to import only request and render_template. No other code changes are needed because there are no references to make_response elsewhere in the snippet.

Concretely:

• Edit devsecops-demo/routes-01.py, line 2.
• Change from flask import request, render_template, make_response to from flask import request, render_template.
• No additional methods, imports, or definitions are required.

To fix the problem, remove the unused local variable read while preserving all existing behavior. Because the value is never used and reading a query argument has no necessary side effects, dropping the assignment is safe and keeps the function semantics unchanged.

Concretely, in devsecops-demo/routes-01.py, inside the index view, delete line 12: read = bool(request.args.get('read')). No other lines need to change, and no new imports or definitions are required.

---

[github-advanced-security]

templateanalyzer found more than 20 potential problems in the proposed changes. Check the Files changed tab for more details.

In general, to fix log forging you should ensure any user-controlled data included in log messages is normalized before logging. For plain-text logs, this usually means removing or replacing newline and other control characters so that an attacker cannot break the log format or create additional fake log entries. For logs that may be rendered as HTML, HTML-encode user input first.

Here, the vulnerable value is str, which includes drive from Request.Query. We can preserve the current behavior of the application while preventing log forging by sanitizing drive (or str) before it is logged. The simplest, non-invasive change is to create a sanitized version of str that removes \r and \n (and optionally other control characters) and log that instead. This leaves command execution behavior (if any) untouched and only affects the representation in the logs.

Concretely, in src/webapp01/Pages/Privacy.cshtml.cs, inside OnGet:

• After computing str, introduce a new variable, e.g. sanitizedStr, that is derived from str with newline characters removed using string.Replace("\r", "").Replace("\n", ""). This matches the pattern from the recommendation.
• Change the call _logger.LogInformation($"Executing command: {str}"); to log sanitizedStr instead.
• No new namespaces are needed, since string.Replace is from System, which is already implicitly available.

No other lines (23–25) use tainted input, so they do not need modification.

In general, the fix is to ensure the SQL connection string explicitly enforces encryption by including Encrypt=True (or Encrypt=true) in the connection string used to create SqlConnection. This makes the client require transport encryption rather than silently falling back to an unencrypted session if a man-in-the-middle or misconfiguration disables encryption.

The best targeted fix here is to update the DB_CONNECTION constant in DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs so that the literal connection string gains an Encrypt=True; segment, keeping the rest of the behavior unchanged. No code using DB_CONNECTION needs to change; the SqlConnection call will simply inherit the updated connection string. A minimal, clear change is to append Encrypt=True; to the existing constant:
"Server=demo-server;Database=SecurityDemo;User Id=demouser;Password=DemoPass2026!;Encrypt=True;";

This only requires editing the constant declaration on line 21 in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs. No additional imports or methods are needed.

To fix the problem, user-provided data must be sanitized or encoded before being logged so that it cannot inject new lines or control characters that alter the structure of the log. For typical plain-text logs, this means stripping or replacing newline and carriage-return characters from the untrusted input before interpolation. The rest of the log message (static text and exception details) can remain as is.

The best minimally invasive fix here is to create a sanitized version of testInput inside the catch block before logging, using Replace to remove \r and \n. This keeps existing behavior (the same data content minus dangerous control characters) and does not require changes to the logging configuration or other code paths. We only modify the log line on 68 inside OnGet in DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs.

Concretely:

• In the catch (Exception ex) block starting at line 65, introduce a new local variable, e.g. safeTestInput, that is derived from testInput with line breaks removed: testInput.Replace("\r", "").Replace("\n", "").
• Update the _logger.LogError call on line 68 to use safeTestInput instead of testInput.
• We do not need new imports; string.Replace is available in System, which is already implicitly available in C#.

In general, to prevent log forging when logging user-provided values, you should sanitize or encode the input before logging it. For plain-text logs, remove or normalize newline and other control characters so an attacker cannot inject additional log lines or confuse log parsers. For logs that will be rendered as HTML, HTML-encode the user input before logging.

In this specific case, the best fix that preserves existing functionality is to sanitize testInput before including it in the log message. Since the log format is unspecified but typical ASP.NET Core logging goes to plain text or structured logs, we can defensively strip out \r and \n characters from testInput before logging. We will do this right before the _logger.LogInformation call on line 63 by introducing a local sanitizedTestInput that uses Replace to remove newlines, and then log that variable instead of the raw testInput. This change is localized to the OnGet method in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs and does not require any new imports or changes to behavior beyond removing line breaks from the logged representation of the query parameter.

Concretely:

• In the if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(testInput)) block, add a line to create sanitizedTestInput, e.g. var sanitizedTestInput = testInput.Replace("\r", string.Empty).Replace("\n", string.Empty);.
• Update the _logger.LogInformation message on line 63 to interpolate sanitizedTestInput rather than testInput.

In general, there are two complementary ways to fix this issue: (1) change the regex to avoid constructs that cause catastrophic backtracking (e.g., avoid nested or overlapping quantified groups), and/or (2) ensure that any regex evaluated on untrusted input has a timeout, so that even if the pattern is expensive, it cannot tie up the server for long. In .NET, this is done by using the Regex constructor overload that accepts a TimeSpan match timeout or by setting a default regex timeout application-wide.

To fix this specific case without changing existing functionality, we should preserve the intended matching behavior as much as possible while eliminating the ReDoS risk. The simplest and safest change, given we must not assume broader context, is to re-create the InsecureRegex with a finite timeout using the constructor overload new Regex(pattern, options, matchTimeout). This changes only performance characteristics and error behavior (throwing a RegexMatchTimeoutException on overly complex matches) but leaves the logical pattern unchanged. Concretely, in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, update the InsecureRegex field declaration at line 24 to use a timeout, for example TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(500) or TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1). Since System is not yet imported in this file, we must add using System; at the top so TimeSpan is available. No other logic changes are necessary, because the existing try/catch (Exception ex) around the match will also catch any timeout exceptions and log them.

General fix: Replace the generic catch (Exception) with one or more specific exception types that are reasonably expected from the code in the try block (here, database-related failures). Optionally, add a secondary catch or catch-all that rethrows unexpected exceptions instead of silently logging them, so that truly abnormal situations are not masked.

Best minimal fix here without changing outward behavior: change the catch (Exception ex) surrounding the SqlConnection usage to catch SqlException, which is the primary exception thrown by Microsoft.Data.SqlClient. Keep logging behavior the same (still log ex.Message). Since the code inside the try is only instantiating SqlConnection and not opening it, in practice the only realistic failures are SQL provider issues (SqlException) or other configuration/runtime bugs; constraining the catch to SqlException addresses CodeQL’s concern while preserving the “log and continue” flow.

Edits needed:

• In src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, within the OnGet method’s SQL connection section (lines 72–83), update:

  • catch (Exception ex) → catch (SqlException ex)

No new imports are required because using Microsoft.Data.SqlClient; is already present at line 10.

To fix redundant ToString() calls in interpolated strings, pass the object directly into the interpolation and let the language invoke ToString() implicitly. This keeps behavior identical while simplifying the code.

In this file, the only flagged instance is on line 68 in OnGet, where the catch block logs an error with $"Regex evaluation failed ... Exception details: {ex.ToString()}". The best fix is to remove the .ToString() call and interpolate ex directly: $"... Exception details: {ex}". No additional methods, imports, or definitions are required, and no behavior change occurs because Exception.ToString() is what interpolation would call anyway.

Concretely, in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, replace the line:

_logger.LogError($"Regex evaluation failed for user input: {testInput}. Exception details: {ex.ToString()}");

with:

_logger.LogError($"Regex evaluation failed for user input: {testInput}. Exception details: {ex}");

In general, to fix a “generic catch clause” you should catch the specific exception types that the protected code can reasonably throw and that you actually intend to handle, letting all other exceptions propagate so that higher-level handlers or the framework can deal with them appropriately.

For this specific block (lines 58–69), the risky operation is InsecureRegex.IsMatch(testInput). Typical, expected exceptions here are:

• RegexMatchTimeoutException when regex evaluation times out.
• ArgumentException if something about the pattern or options is invalid (even though the pattern is static, this is still the most relevant specific type for regex-related argument issues).

The best minimal fix without changing visible behavior is to:

• Replace catch (Exception ex) with two specific catch blocks: one for RegexMatchTimeoutException and one for ArgumentException.
• Keep the existing logging behavior inside each, so functionality (logging the failure plus exception details) remains the same.
• Leave any other unexpected exceptions unhandled here so they can bubble up.

No new imports are needed if System is already in scope via implicit usings (typical for ASP.NET Core). If it isn’t, then the fully qualified names System.Text.RegularExpressions.RegexMatchTimeoutException and System.ArgumentException can be used, but given we already have using System.Text.RegularExpressions;, RegexMatchTimeoutException is available directly, and ArgumentException is part of System, which is usually imported implicitly in ASP.NET Core projects.

Concretely, in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, adjust the try/catch that wraps the regex evaluation (around line 58–69) to replace the generic catch (Exception ex) with two specific catch blocks.

In general, to fix this issue you should replace the pattern “check ContainsKey then access via indexer” with a single call to TryGetValue, which both tests for existence and retrieves the value in one operation. This reduces redundant lookups and aligns with recommended usage for dictionary-like collections.

For this specific file, on line 55 you should remove the ternary expression that calls Request.Query.ContainsKey("test") and indexer access Request.Query["test"], and instead call Request.Query.TryGetValue("test", out var testValues) and use the resulting StringValues to build testInput. A concise way that preserves the current behavior (defaulting to "" when the parameter is absent or null-ish) is:

• Use TryGetValue into a local variable (e.g., var testInputRaw).
• If TryGetValue fails, set testInput to "".
• Otherwise, call ToString() on testInputRaw and coalesce to "".

IQueryCollection.TryGetValue is in Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http, but you don’t need a new using because you’re already accessing Request.Query. No new methods or external dependencies are needed; only the single line that currently uses ContainsKey must be replaced with a small block using TryGetValue.

In general, to fix “inefficient use of ContainsKey and indexer,” replace sequences like if (dict.ContainsKey(k)) { var v = dict[k]; ... } with a single call to dict.TryGetValue(k, out var v) and use the v from the out parameter. This avoids performing two dictionary lookups.

For this specific case in src/webapp01/Pages/DevSecOps-7492.cshtml.cs, line 42 computes userName by first checking Request.Query.ContainsKey("user") and then accessing Request.Query["user"]. We should instead call Request.Query.TryGetValue("user", out var userValues) once, and then, if successful, take the first value (or .ToString()) from userValues. Since the existing code returns "anonymous" both when the key is missing and when the value is null, we must preserve that behavior.

Request.Query.TryGetValue returns a bool and outputs an IEnumerable<string>-like StringValues (from Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives), which already has a meaningful .ToString() implementation that concatenates values. Therefore, we can safely write:

string userName = Request.Query.TryGetValue("user", out var userValues)
    ? userValues.ToString() ?? "anonymous"
    : "anonymous";

This change is confined to the OnGet method, around line 42. No new imports or additional methods are required, because TryGetValue is already available on IQueryCollection in ASP.NET Core and StringValues is already in scope via existing framework references.

---

[github-advanced-security]

checkov found more than 20 potential problems in the proposed changes. Check the Files changed tab for more details.