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58 changes: 58 additions & 0 deletions rules/credential_access_suspicious_vault_client_dll_load.yml
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name: Suspicious Vault client DLL load
id: 64af2e2e-2309-4079-9c0f-985f1dd930f5
version: 1.0.0
description: |
Identifies loading of the Vault client DLL by an unusual process. Adversaries can abuse the functions provided
by the Credential Vault Client Library to enumerate or harvest saved credentials.
labels:
tactic.id: TA0006
tactic.name: Credential Access
tactic.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
technique.id: T1555
technique.name: Credentials from Password Stores
technique.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
subtechnique.id: T1555.004
subtechnique.name: Windows Credential Manager
subtechnique.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/incident-response/active-breach-evading-defenses/
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16

condition: >
sequence
maxspan 2m
|spawn_process and ps.exe != ''
and
not
(
ps.child.exe imatches
(
'?:\\Windows\\System32\\MDMAppInstaller.exe',
'?:\\Windows\\uus\\*\\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe',
'?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\*\\dfsvc.exe',
'?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\*\\mscorsvw.exe',
'?:\\Program Files\\*.exe',
'?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe',
'?:\\Windows\\winsxs\\*\\TiWorker.exe'
)
or
(ps.child.exe imatches '?:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\taskhostw.exe' and ps.args intersects ('-k', 'netsvcs', '-p', '-s', 'Schedule'))
or
(ps.child.exe imatches '?:\\Windows\\System32\\RuntimeBroker.exe')
or
(ps.exe imatches ('?:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.*.exe', '?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\NGenTask.exe'))
or
(ps.child.exe imatches '?:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\svchost.exe' and ps.child.args intersects ('-k', 'wusvcs', '-p', '-s', 'WaaSMedicSvc'))
or
(ps.child.exe imatches '?:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\svchost.exe' and ps.child.args intersects ('-k', 'netsvcs', '-p', '-s', 'TokenBroker'))
or
(ps.child.exe imatches '?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\BackgroundTaskHost.exe' and ps.child.args not in ('-ServerName:BackgroundTaskHost.WebAccountProvider'))
)
| by ps.child.uuid
|load_dll and image.name ~= 'vaultcli.dll'| by ps.uuid

output: >
Suspicious process %2.ps.exe loaded the Credential Vault Client DLL for potential credentials harvesting
severity: high

min-engine-version: 2.4.0